Ecc 3:17 | KD | STEP | “I said in mine heart: God shall judge the righteous as well as the wicked: for there is there a time for every purpose and for every work.” Since “the righteous” stands first, the word ישׁפּט has here the double sense of judging [richtens = setting upright] = acting uprightly, justly by one, as in the shofteni of ; , etc., and of judging = inflicting punishment. To the righteous, as well as to the wicked, God will administer that which of right belongs to them. But this does not immediately happen, and has to be waited for a long time, for there is a definite time for every undertaking ( ), and for (על, in the more modern form of the language, interchanges promiscue with אל ht and ל, e.g. , ; ; Ewald, §217 i ) every work there is a “time.” This שׁם, defended by all the old interpreters, cannot have a temporal sense: tunc = in die judicii (Jerome, Targ.), cf. ; 36:13, for “a time of judgment there is for all one day” is not intended, since certainly the שׁם (day of judgment) is this time itself, and not the time of this time. Ewald renders שׁם as pointing to the past, for he thus construes: the righteous and the unrighteous God will judge (for there is a time for everything), and judge ( vav thus explicat., “and that too,” “and indeed”) every act there, i.e. , everything done before. But this שׁם is not only heavy, but also ambiguous and purposeless; and besides, by this parenthesizing of the words וגו עת כּי for there is a time for everything, the principal thought, that with God everything, even His act of judgment, has its time, is robbed of its independence and of the place in the principal clause appropriate to it. But if שׁם is understood adverbially, it certainly has a local meaning connected with it: there, viz., with God, apud Deum ; true, for this use of the word affords the only example, and it stands there in the midst of a very solemn and earnest address. Therefore it lies near to read, with Houbig., Döderl., Palm., and Hitz., שׁם, “a definite time ... has He (God) ordained;” שׂום (שׂים) is the usual word for the ordinances of God in the natural world and in human history ( ; ; Num 24:23; , etc.), and, as in the Assyr. simtuv, so the Heb. שׂימה (שׂוּמה), , signifies lot or fate, decree. With this reading, Elster takes exception to the position of the words; but at Jdg 6:19 also the object goes before שׂם, and “unto every purpose and for every work” is certainly the complement of the object-conception, so that the position of the words is in reality no other than at ; . Quite untenable is Herzfeld’s supposition (Fürst, Vaih.), that שׁם has here the Talm. signification: aestimat, taxat, for (1) this שׁוּם = Arab. sham, has not על, but the accus. after it; (2) the thought referring to the tie on which rests is thereby interrupted. Whether we read שׂם, or take שׁם in the sense of עמּו ( ; , etc.), the thought is the same, and equally congruous: God will judge the innocent and the guilty; it shall be done some time, although not so soon as one might wish it, and think necessary, for God has for every undertaking and for every work its fixed time, also its judicial decision ( vid ., at ); He permits wickedness, lets it develope itself, waits long before He interposes ( vid ., under Isa 18:4.). Reflecting on God’s delay to a time hidden from men, and known only to Himself, Koheleth explains the matter to himself in the following verse: -

‏ Ecclesiastes 3:17

Ecc 3:17 “I said in mine heart: God shall judge the righteous as well as the wicked: for there is there a time for every purpose and for every work.” Since “the righteous” stands first, the word ישׁפּט has here the double sense of judging [richtens = setting upright] = acting uprightly, justly by one, as in the shofteni of Psa 7:9; Psa 26:1, etc., and of judging = inflicting punishment. To the righteous, as well as to the wicked, ^{▼▼The lxx (in Aquila’s manner): σὺν τὸν δίκαιον καὶ σὺν τὸν ἀσεβῆ - according to the Talm. hermeneut. rule, that where the obj. is designated by את, with that which is expressly named, something else is associated, and is to be thought of along with it.}

God will administer that which of right belongs to them. But this does not immediately happen, and has to be waited for a long time, for there is a definite time for every undertaking (Ecc 3:1), and for (על, in the more modern form of the language, interchanges promiscue with אל ht and ל, e.g., Jer 19:15; Eze 22:3; Ewald, §217 i) every work there is a “time.” This שׁם, defended by all the old interpreters, cannot have a temporal sense: tunc = in die judicii (Jerome, Targ.), cf. Psa 14:5; 36:13, for “a time of judgment there is for all one day” is not intended, since certainly the שׁם (day of judgment) is this time itself, and not the time of this time. Ewald renders שׁם as pointing to the past, for he thus construes: the righteous and the unrighteous God will judge (for there is a time for everything), and judge (vav thus explicat., “and that too,” “and indeed”) every act there, i.e., everything done before. But this שׁם is not only heavy, but also ambiguous and purposeless; and besides, by this parenthesizing of the words וגו עת כּי for there is a time for everything, the principal thought, that with God everything, even His act of judgment, has its time, is robbed of its independence and of the place in the principal clause appropriate to it. But if שׁם is understood adverbially, it certainly has a local meaning connected with it: there, viz., with God, apud Deum; true, for this use of the word Gen 49:24 affords the only example, and it stands there in the midst of a very solemn and earnest address. Therefore it lies near to read, with Houbig., Döderl., Palm., and Hitz., שׁם, “a definite time ... has He (God) ordained;” שׂום (שׂים) is the usual word for the ordinances of God in the natural world and in human history (Pro 8:29; Exo 21:13; Num 24:23; Hab 1:12, etc.), and, as in the Assyr. simtuv, so the Heb. שׂימה (שׂוּמה), 2Sa 13:32, signifies lot or fate, decree. ^{▼▼Vid., Schrader’s Keilsch. u. A. T. p. 105, simtu ubilsu, i.e., fate snatched him away (Heb. simah hovilathhu), cf. Fried. Delitzsch’s Assyr. Stud. p. 66f.}

With this reading, Elster takes exception to the position of the words; but at Jdg 6:19 also the object goes before שׂם, and “unto every purpose and for every work” is certainly the complement of the object-conception, so that the position of the words is in reality no other than at Ecc 10:20; Dan 2:17. Quite untenable is Herzfeld’s supposition (Fürst, Vaih.), that שׁם has here the Talm. signification: aestimat, taxat, for (1) this שׁוּם = Arab. sham, has not על, but the accus. after it; (2) the thought referring to the tie on which Ecc 3:18 rests is thereby interrupted. Whether we read שׂם, or take שׁם in the sense of עמּו (Job 25:2; Job 23:14, etc.), the thought is the same, and equally congruous: God will judge the innocent and the guilty; it shall be done some time, although not so soon as one might wish it, and think necessary, for God has for every undertaking and for every work its fixed time, also its judicial decision (vid., at Psa 74:3); He permits wickedness, lets it develope itself, waits long before He interposes (vid., under Isa 18:4.).

Reflecting on God’s delay to a time hidden from men, and known only to Himself, Koheleth explains the matter to himself in the following verse: -