Pro 13:1-15 | KD | STEP | The proverb is so sublime, so weighty, that it manifestly forms a period and conclusion. This is confirmed from the following proverb, which begins like (cf. 5), and anew stamps the collection as intended for youth: 1 A wise son is his father’s correction; But a scorner listens not to rebuke. The lxx, which the Syr. follows, translate Ψἱὸς πανουργὸς ὑπήκοος πατρί, whence it is not to be concluded with Lagarde that they read נוסר in the sense of a Ni . tolerativum ; they correctly understood the text according to the Jewish rule of interpretation, “that which is wanting is to be supplied from the context.” The Targ. had already supplied שׁמע from 1b, and is herein followed by Hitzig, as also by Glassius in the Philologia sacra . But such an ellipse is in the Hebr. style without an example, and would be comprehensible only in passionate, hasty discourse, but in a language in which the representation filius sapiens disciplinam patris audit numbers among the anomalies is not in general possible, and has not even its parallel in Tacitus, Ann . xiii. 56: deesse nobis terra, in qua vivamus - in qua moriemur, non potest , because here the primary idea, which the one expression confirms, the other denies, and besides no particle, such as the ו of this passage before us, stands between them. Böttcher therefore maintains the falling out of the verb, and writes יבּין before בּן; but one says not בין מוסר, but שׁמע מוסר, ; ; Pro 19:27. Should not the clause, as it thus stands, give a sense complete in itself? But מוּסר can hardly, with Schultens and Ewald, be taken as part . Hoph . of יסר: one brought up by his father, for the usage of the language knows מוסר only as part. Hoph . of סוּר. Thus, as Jerome and the Venet . translate: a wise son is the correction of his father, i.e. , the product of the same, as also Fleischer explains, “Attribution of the cause, the ground, as elsewhere of the effect.” But we call that which one has trained (vegetable or animal) his Zucht (= παιδεία in the sense of παίδευμα). To the wise son ( ) who is indebted to the מוסר אב ( ), stands opposed the לץ ( vid ., ), the mocker at religion and virtue, who has no ear for גּערה, strong and stern words which awaken in him a wholesome fear (cf. , : ἐν φόβῳ).

‏ Proverbs 13:1-15

The proverb Pro 12:28 is so sublime, so weighty, that it manifestly forms a period and conclusion. This is confirmed from the following proverb, which begins like Pro 10:1 (cf. 5), and anew stamps the collection as intended for youth: 1 A wise son is his father’s correction; But a scorner listens not to rebuke.

The lxx, which the Syr. follows, translate Ψἱὸς πανουργὸς ὑπήκοος πατρί, whence it is not to be concluded with Lagarde that they read נוסר in the sense of a Ni. tolerativum; they correctly understood the text according to the Jewish rule of interpretation, “that which is wanting is to be supplied from the context.” The Targ. had already supplied שׁמע from 1b, and is herein followed by Hitzig, as also by Glassius in the Philologia sacra. But such an ellipse is in the Hebr. style without an example, and would be comprehensible only in passionate, hasty discourse, but in a language in which the representation filius sapiens disciplinam patris audit numbers among the anomalies is not in general possible, and has not even its parallel in Tacitus, Ann. xiii. 56: deesse nobis terra, in qua vivamus - in qua moriemur, non potest, because here the primary idea, which the one expression confirms, the other denies, and besides no particle, such as the ו of this passage before us, stands between them. Böttcher therefore maintains the falling out of the verb, and writes יבּין before בּן; but one says not בין מוסר, but שׁמע מוסר, Pro 1:8; Pro 4:1; Pro 19:27. Should not the clause, as it thus stands, give a sense complete in itself? But מוּסר can hardly, with Schultens and Ewald, be taken as part. Hoph. of יסר: one brought up by his father, for the usage of the language knows מוסר only as part. Hoph. of סוּר. Thus, as Jerome and the Venet. translate: a wise son is the correction of his father, i.e., the product of the same, as also Fleischer explains, “Attribution of the cause, the ground, as elsewhere of the effect.” But we call that which one has trained (vegetable or animal) his Zucht (= παιδεία in the sense of παίδευμα). To the wise son (Pro 10:1) who is indebted to the מוסר אב (Pro 4:1), stands opposed the לץ (vid., Pro 1:22), the mocker at religion and virtue, who has no ear for גּערה, strong and stern words which awaken in him a wholesome fear (cf. Pro 17:10, Jud 1:23 : ἐν φόβῳ). Pro 13:2 2 From the fruit of the mouth of a man he himself enjoys good; But the delight of the godless is violence. 2a = Pro 12:14, where ישׂבּע for יאכל. A man with a fruit-bringing mouth, himself enjoys also the blessing of his fruit-producing speech; his food (cf. βρῶμα, Joh 4:34) is the good action in words, which in themselves are deeds, and are followed by deeds; this good action affords enjoyment not merely to others, but also to himself. Ewald and Bertheau attract יאכל to 2b; so also does Fleischer: “the violence which the בּגדים wish to do to others turns back upon themselves; they must eat it also, i.e., bear its evil consequences.” The thought would then be like Pro 10:6 : os improborum obteget violentia, and “to eat violence” is parallel to “to drink (Pro 26:6) violence (injury).” But wherefore then the naming of the soul, of which elsewhere it is said that it hungers or satiates itself, but never simply (but cf. Luk 12:19) that it eats? On the contrary, נפשׁ means also appetitus, Pro 23:2, and particularly wicked desire, Psa 27:12; here, as Psa 35:25, the object of this desire (Psychol. p. 202). Regarding בגדים, vid., above, p. 85. There are such as do injury in a cunning deceitful manner to their neighbour to their own advantage. While the former (the righteous) distributes to his neighbour from the inner impulse without having such a result in view, yet according to God’s direction he derives enjoyment himself therefrom: the desire of the latter goes to חמס, ἀδικία, and thus to the enjoyment of good unrighteously and violently seized. Pro 13:3 3 He that guardeth his mouth keepeth his soul; He that openeth his lips, to him it is destruction. 3a is extended in Pro 21:23 to a distich. Mouth and soul stand in closest interchangeable relation, for speech is the most immediate and continuous expression of the soul; thus whoever guards his mouth keeps his soul (the Venet., with excellent rendering of the synonym, ὁ τηρῶν τὸ στόμα ἑαυτοῦ φυλάσσει τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ), for he watches that no sinful vain thoughts rise up in his soul and come forth in words, and because he thus keeps his soul, i.e., himself, safe from the destructive consequences of the sins of the tongue. On the contrary, he who opens wide his lips, i.e., cannot hold his mouth (lxx ὁ δὲ προπετὴς χείλεσιν), but expresses unexamined and unconsidered whatever comes into his mind and gives delight, he is destruction to himself (supply הוּא), or to him it is destruction (supply זאת); both interpretations are possible, the parallelism brings nearer the former, and the parallel Pro 18:7 brings nearer the latter. פּשׂק means to spread (Schultens diducere cum ruptura vel ad rupturam usque), here the lips, Pih. Eze 16:25, the legs, Arab. fashkh, farshkh; vid., regarding the R. פש, to extend, to spread out, Fleischer in the supplements to the A. L. Z. 1843, col. 116. Regarding the Mishle word מחתּה, vid., under Pro 10:14. Pro 13:4

The three proverbs (Pro 13:1-3) which refer to hearing and speaking are now following by a fourth which, like Pro 13:2 and Pro 13:3, speaks of the נפשׁ.

The soul of the sluggard desires, yet has not;

But the soul of the industrious is richly satisfied.

The view that the o in נפשׁו עצל is the cholem compaginis, Böttcher, §835, meets with the right answer that this would be the only example of a vocal casus in the whole of gnomic poetry; but when on his own part (Neue Aehrenlese, §1305) he regards נפשׁו as the accus. of the nearer definition (= בּנפשׁו), he proceeds inadvertently on the view that the first word of the proverb is מתאוּה, while we read מתאוּה, and נפשׁו is thus the nom. of the subject. נפשׁו עצל means “his (the sluggard’s) soul” (for עצל occurs as explanatory permutative briefly for נפשׁ עצל), as סעיפיה פּריּה means “its branches (i.e., of the fruitful tree),” Isa 17:6. One might, it is true, add ה to the following word here, as at Pro 14:13; but the similar expression appertaining to the syntax ornata occurs also 2Sa 22:33; Psa 71:7, and elsewhere, where this is impracticable. Meîri appropriately compares the scheme Exo 2:6, she saw him, viz., the boy. With reference to the ואין here violently (cf. Pro 28:1) introduced, Böttcher rightly remarks, that it is an adverb altogether like necquidquam, Pro 14:6; Pro 20:4, Psa 68:21, etc., thus: appetit necquidquam anima ejus, scilicet pigri. 4b shows the meaning of the desire that has not, for there תדשּׁן occurs, a favourite strong Mishle word (Pro 11:25; Pro 28:25, etc.) for abundant satisfaction (the lxx here, as at 28:25, ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ, sc. ἔσονται, instead of which, Montfaucon supposed πιμελείᾳ, which is, however, a word not authenticated). The slothful wishes and dreams of prosperity and abundance (cf. Pro 21:25., a parallel which the Syr. has here in view), but his desire remains unsatisfied, since the object is not gained but only lost by doing nothing; the industrious gain, and that richly, what the slothful wishes for, but in vain. Pro 13:5

Two proverbs of the character of the righteous and of the effect of righteousness:

A deceitful thing the righteous hateth;

But the godless disgraceth and putteth to shame.

With דּבּר in the sphere of an intelligible generality (as here of falsehood, or Psa 41:9 of worthlessness) a concrete event is in view, as with דּברי in the following plur. a general fact is separated into its individual instances and circumstances (vid., at Psa 65:4); for דבר means not only the word in which the soul reveals itself, but also any fact in which an inner principle or a general fact or a whole comes forth to view. The righteous hateth all that bears in it the character of a falsehood (punctuate דּבר־שׁקר with Gaja, cf. Pro 12:19), but the godless ... Should we now, with Bertheau, Hitzig, and others, translate “acteth basely and shamefully”? It is true that both Hiphs. may be regarded as transitive, but this expression gives not right contrast to 5a, and is pointless. We have seen at Pro 10:5 that הבישׁ, like השׂכּיל, has also a causative signification: to put to shame, i.e., bring shame upon others, and that Pro 19:26, where מבישׁ וּמחפּיר are connected, this causative signification lies nearer than the intrinsically transitive. Thus it will also here be meant, that while the righteous hateth all that is false or that is tainted by falsehood, the godless on the contrary loves to disgrace and to put to shame. But it is a question whether יבאישׁ is to be derived from בּאשׁ = בּושׁ, and thus is of the same meaning as יבישׁ; הבאישׁ, Isa 30:5, which there signifies pudefactum esse, is pointed הבאישׁ, and is thus derived from a יבשׁ = בּושׁ, vid., 2Sa 19:6. But הבאישׁ occurs also as Hiph. of בּאשׁ, and means transitively to make of an evil savour, Gen 34:30, cf. Exo 5:21, as well as intransitively to come into evil savour, 1Sa 27:12. In this sense of putidum faciens, bringing into evil savour, יבאישׁ occurs here as at Pro 19:26, suitably along with יחפיר; Pro 19:26 is the putidum facere by evil report (slander), into which the foolish son brings his parents, here by his own evil report, thus to be thought of as brought about by means of slander. The old translators here fall into error; Luther renders both Hiphils reflexively; only the Venet. (after Kimchi) is right: ὀζώσει (from an ὀζοῦν as trans. to ὀζεῖν) καὶ ἀτιμώσει, he makes to be of ill odour and dishonours. Pro 13:6 6 Righteousness protecteth an upright walk, And godlessness bringeth sinners to destruction.

The double thought is closely like that of Pro 11:5, but is peculiarly and almost enigmatically expressed. As there, צדקה and רשׁעה are meant of a twofold inner relation to God, which consists of a ruling influence over man’s conduct and a determination of his walk. But instead of naming the persons of the תּמימי דּרך and חטּאים as the objects of this influence, the proverb uses the abstract expression, but with personal reference, תּם־דּרך and חטּאת dna תּם, and designates in two words the connection of this twofold character with the principles of their conduct. What is meant by תּצּר and תּסלּף proceeds from the contrasted relationship of the two (cf. Pro 22:12). נצר signifies observare, which is not suitable here, but also tueri (τηρεῖν), to which סלּף (vid., at Pro 11:3, and in Gesen. Thesaurus), not so much in the sense of “to turn upside down,” pervertere (as Pro 11:3; Pro 23:8), as in the sense of “to overthrow,” evertere (as e.g., Pro 21:12), forms a fitting contrast. He who walks forth with an unfeigned and untroubled pure mind stands under the shield and the protection of righteousness (cf. with this prosopopoeia Psa 25:21), from which such a walk proceeds, and at the same time under the protection of God, to whom righteousness appertains, is well-pleasing. but he who in his conduct permits himself to be determined by sin, godlessness (cf. Zec 5:8) from which such a love for sin springs forth, brings to destruction; in other words: God, from whom the רשע, those of a perverse disposition, tear themselves away, makes the sin their snare by virtue of the inner connection established by Him between the רשׁעה and the destruction (Isa 9:17). In the lxx this 6th verse was originally wanting; the translation in the version of Aquila, in the Complut. and elsewhere, which the Syr. follows, falsely makes חטאת the subj.: τοὺς δὲ ἀσεβεῖς φαύλους ποιεῖ ἁμαρτία. Pro 13:7

Two proverbs of riches and poverty: -

There is one who maketh himself rich and hath nothing;

There is another who representeth himself poor amid great riches.

A sentence which includes in itself the judgment which Pro 12:9 expresses. To the Hithpa. התכּבּד (to make oneself of importance) there are associated here two others, in the meaning to make oneself something, without anything after it, thus to place oneself so or so, Ewald, §124a. To the clauses with ו there is supplied a self-intelligible לּו. Pro 13:8 8 A ransom for a man’s life are his riches; But the poor heareth no threatening.

Bertheau falls into error when he understands גּערה of warning; the contrast points to threatening with the loss of life. The wealth of the rich before the judgment is not here to be thought of; for apart from this, that the Torâ only in a single case permits, or rather ordains (Exo 21:29.), ransom from the punishment of death, and declares it in all other cases inadmissible, Num 35:31. (one might indeed think of an administration of justice not strictly in accordance with the Mosaic law, or altogether accessible to bribery), 8b does not accord therewith, since the poor in such cases would fare ill, because one would lay hold on his person. But one may think e.g., on waylayers as those introduced as speaking Pro 1:11-14. The poor has no room to fear that such will threateningly point their swords against his breast, for there is nothing to be got from him: he has nothing, one sees it in him and he is known as such. But the rich is a valuable prize for them, and he has to congratulate himself if he is permitted to escape with his life. Also in the times of war and commotion it may be seen that riches endanger the life of their possessor, and that in fortunate cases they are given as a ransom for his life, while his poverty places the poor man in safety. To לא שׁמע Hitzig fittingly compares Job 3:18; Job 39:7 : he does not hear, he has no need to hear. Michaelis, Umbreit, Löwenstein (who calls to remembrance the state of things under despotic governments, especially in the East) also explain 8b correctly; and Fleischer remarks: pauper minas hostiles non audit, i.e., non minatur ei hostis. Ewald’s syntactic refinement: “Yet he became poor who never heard an accusation,” presents a thought not in harmony with 8a. Pro 13:9

The three following proverbs in Pro 13:9-11 have at least this in common, that the two concluding words of each correspond with one another almost rhythmically. 9 The light of the righteous burneth joyously, And the lamp of the godless goeth out.

The second line = Pro 24:20, cf. Pro 20:20. In the Book of Job 18:5., אור רשׁעים ידעך and נרו עליו ידעך (cf. Pro 21:17) stand together, and there is spoken of (Pro 29:3) a divine נר as well as a divine אור which enlightens the righteous; however, one must say that the poet, as he, Pro 6:3, deliberately calls the Torâ אור, and the commandment, as derived from it and separated, נר, so also here designedly calls the righteous אור, viz., אור היום (Pro 4:18, cf. 2Pe 1:19), and the godless נר, viz., נר דלוק - the former imparts the sunny daylight, the latter the light of tapers set in darkness. The authentic punctuation is אור־צדיקים, Ben-Naphtali’s is 'אור צ' si s'i without Makkeph. To ישׂמח Hitzig compares the “laughing tongue of the taper” of Meidâni, iii. 475; Kimchi also the “laughing, i.e., amply measured span, טפח שׂוהק,” of the Talmud; for the light laughs when it brightly shines, and increases rather than decreases; in Arab. samuḥa has in it the idea of joy directly related to that of liberality. The lxx translates ישׂמח incorrectly by διαπαντός, and has a distich following Pro 13:9, the first line of which is ψυχαὶ δόλιαι (נפשׁ רמיּה?) πλανῶνται ἐν ἁμαρτίαις, and the second line is from Psa 37:21. Pro 13:10 10 Nothing comes by pride but contention; But wisdom is with those who receive counsel.

The restrictive רק (only) does not, according to the sense, belong to בּזדון (by pride), but to מצּה, vid., under Psa 32:6 and Job 2:10. Of יתּן = there is, vid., under Pro 10:24. Bertheau’s “one causes” is not exact, for “one” [man] is the most general personal subject, but יתן is in such cases to be regarded as impersonal: by pride is always a something which causes nothing but quarrel and strife, for the root of pride is egoism. Line second is a variant to Pro 11:2. Bescheidenheit (modesty) is in our old [German] language exactly equivalent to Klugheit (prudence). But here the צנועים are more exactly designated as permitting themselves to be advised; the elsewhere reciprocal נועץ has here once a tolerative signification, although the reciprocal is also allowable: with such as reciprocally advise themselves, and thus without positiveness supplement each his own knowledge by means of that of another. Most interpreters regard 10b as a substantival clause, but why should not יתן be carried forward? With such as permit themselves to be advised, or are not too proud to sustain with others the relation of giving and receiving, there is wisdom, since instead of hatred comes wisdom - the peaceful fruit resulting from an interchange of views. Pro 13:11 11 Wealth by means of fraud always becomes less; But he that increaseth it by labour gains always more.

We punctuate הון־מהבל (with Makkeph, as in Ven. 1521, Antw. 1582, Frank.-on-the-Oder 1595, Gen. 1618, Leyden 1662), not הון מהבל (as other editions, and e.g., also Löwenstein); for the meaning is not that the wealth becomes less by הבל (Targ., but not the Syr.), or that it is less than הבל (Umbreit), but הון־מהבל is one idea: wealth proceeding from הבל; but הבל tub ;הב, properly a breath (Theod. ἀπὸ ἀτμοῦ or ἀτμίδος), then appearance without reality (Aquila, ἀπὸ ματαιότητος), covers itself here by that which we call swindle, i.e., by morally unrestrained fraudulent and deceitful speculation in contrast to solid and real gain. The translations: ἐπισπουδαζομένη μετὰ ἀνομίας (lxx), ὑπερσπουδαζομένη (Symmachus, Quinta), ^{▼▼A fragment of an anonymous translation, so called from the place it holds in Origen’s Hexapla.}festinata (Jerome), do not necessarily suppose the phrase מהבּל = מבהל, Pro 20:21 Kerı̂, for wealth which comes מהבל is obtained in a windy (unsubstantial) manner and as if by storm, of which the proverb holds good: “so gewonnen so zerronnen” (= quickly come, quickly go). מהבל needs neither to be changed into that unhebraic מהבּל (Hitzig) nor into the cognate מבהל (Ewald), but yet inferior to מהבל in the content of its idea. The contrast of one who by fraud and deception quickly arrives at wealth is one who brings it together in his hand, ἐπὶ χειρός (Venet.), i.e., always as often as he can bear it in his hand and bring it forth (Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, and Lagarde), or according to the measure of the hand, κατὰ χεῖρα (which means “according to external ability”), so that על, which is applied to the formation of adverbs, e.g., Psa 31:24 (Hitzig) - by both explanations על־יד has the meaning of “gradually,” - is used as in the post-bibl. Hebr. על יד על יד = מעט מעט, e.g., Schabbath 156a (vid., Aruch under על) (distinguish from ביד = with thought, intentionally, Berachoth 52b). There is scarcely a word having more significations that יד. Connected with על, it means at one time side or place, at another mediation or direction; that which is characteristic here is the omission of the pronoun (על־ידו, על־ידיו). The lxx translates על יד with the unrestrained freedom which it allows to itself by μετ ̓ εὐσεβείας, and has following πληθυνθήσεται another line, δίκαιος οἰκτείρει καὶ κιχρᾷ (from Psa 37:26). Pro 13:12

The figures of paradise in Pro 13:12 and Pro 13:14 require us to take along with them the intermediate verse (Pro 13:13). 12 Deferred waiting maketh the heart sick, And a tree of life is a wish accomplished.

Singularly the lxx Κρείσσων ἐναρχόμενος βοηθῶν καρδίᾳ, followed by the Syr. (which the Targ. Transcribes): ^{▼▼That the Targum of the Proverbs is a Jewish elaboration of the Peshito text, vid., Nöldeke in Merx' Archiv, Bd. ii. pp. 246-49.}

Better is he who begins to help than he who remains in hesitating expectation, by which תחלת is doubled, and is derived once from הוחיל, to wait, and the second time from החל, to begin. If the lxx, with its imitators, deteriorates to such a degree proverbs so clear, beautiful, and inviolable, what may one expect from it in the case of those not easily understood! משּׁך signifies also, Isa 18:2, to be widely extended (cf. Arab. meshaḳ), here in the sense of time, as נמשׁך, to prolong, Isa 13:22, and post-bibl. משׁך הזּמן, the course of time. Regarding תּוחלת, vid., at Pro 10:28, where as Pro 11:27 תּקות, here תּאוה, as also Psa 78:29 of the object of the wish, and with בוא in the sense of being fulfilled (cf. Jos 21:43), as there with הביא in the sense of accomplishing or performing. Extended waiting makes the heart sick, causes heart-woe (מחלה, part. fem. Hiph. of חלה, to be slack, feeble, sick; R. חל, to loosen, to make loose); on the contrary, a wish that has been fulfilled is a tree of life (cf. p. 23), of a quickening and strengthening influence, like that tree of paradise which was destined to renew and extend the life of man. Pro 13:13 13 Whoever despiseth the word is in bonds to it, And he that feareth the commandment is rewarded.

The word is thought of as ordering, and thus in the sense of the commandment, e.g., 1Sa 17:19; Dan 9:23, Dan 9:25. That which is here said is always true where the will of a man has subordinated itself to the authoritative will of a superior, but principally the proverb has in view the word of God, the מצוה κατ ̓ ἐξ. as the expression of the divine will, which (Pro 6:3) appears as the secondary, with the תורה, the general record of the divine will. Regarding בּוּז ל of contemptuous, despiteful opposition, vid., at Pro 6:30, cf. Pro 11:12. Joël records the prevailing tradition, for he translates: “Whoever despises advice rushes into destruction; whoever holds the commandment in honour is perfect.” But that ישׁלּם is to be understood neither of perfection nor of peace (lxx and Jerome), but means compensabitur (here not in the sense of punishment, but of reward), we know from Pro 11:31. The translation also of יחבל לו by “he rushes into destruction” (lxx καταφθαρήσεται, which the Syr.-Hexap. repeats; Luther, “he destroys himself;” the Venet. οἰχησεταί οἱ, periet sibi) fails, for one does not see what should have determined the poet to choose just this word, and, instead of the ambiguous dat. ethicus, not rather to say יחבּל נפשׁו. So also this יחבל is not with Gesenius to be connected with חבל = Arab. khabl, corrumpere, but with חבל = Arab. ḥabl, ligare, obligare. Whoever places himself contemptuously against a word which binds him to obedience will nevertheless not be free from that word, but is under pledge until he redeem the pledge by the performance of the obedience refused, or till that higher will enforce payment of the debt withheld by visiting with punishment. Jerome came near the right interpretation: ipse se in futurum obligat; Abulwalîd refers to Exo 22:25; and Parchon, Rashi, and others paraphrase: משׁכּן יתמשׁכּן עליו, he is confiscated as by mortgage. Schultens has, with the correct reference of the לו not to the contemner, but to the word, well established and illustrated this explanation: he is pledged by the word, Arab. marhwan (rahyn), viz., pigneratus paenae (Livius, xxix. 36). Ewald translates correctly: he is pledged to it; and Hitzig gives the right explanation: “A חבלה [a pledge, cf. Pro 20:16] is handed over to the offended law with the חבוּלה [the bad conduct] by the despiser himself, which lapses when he has exhausted the forbearance, so that the punishment is inflicted.” The lxx has another proverb following Pro 13:13 regarding υἱὸς δόλιος and οἰκέτης σοφός; the Syr. has adopted it; Jerome has here the proverb of the animae dolosae (vid., at Pro 13:9). Pro 13:14 14 The doctrine of the wise man is a fountain of life, To escape the snares of death.

An integral distich, vid., p. 8 of the Introduction. Essentially like 14a, Pro 10:11 says, “a fountain of life is the mouth of the righteous.” The figure of the fountain of life with the teleological 'לסור וגו (the ל of the end and consequence of the action) is repeated Pro 14:27. The common non-biblical figure of the laquei mortis leads also to the idea of death as יקוּשׁ a fowler, Psa 91:3. If it is not here a mere formula for the dangers of death (Hitzig), then the proverb is designed to state that the life which springs from the doctrine of the wise man as from a fountain of health, for the disciple who will receive it, communicates to him knowledge and strength, to know where the snares of destruction lie, and to hasten with vigorous steps away when they threaten to entangle him. Pro 13:15

Four proverbs follow, whose connection appears to have been occasioned by the sound of their words (שׂכל ... כל, בדעת ... ברע, רשׁע ... רישׁ). 15 Fine prudence produceth favour; But the way of the malicious is uncultivated.

Regarding שׂכל טוב (thus to be punctuated, without Makkeph with Munach, after Codd. and old editions), vid., p. 84; for the most part it corresponds with that which in a deep ethical sense we call fine culture. Regarding יתּן, vid., at Pro 10:10 : it is not used here, as there, impersonally, but has a personal subject: he brings forth, causes. Fine culture, which shows men how to take the right side and in all circumstances to strike the right key, exercises a kindly heart-winning influence, not merely, as would be expressed by ימצא חן, to the benefit of its possessor, but, as is expressed by יתּן חן, such as removes generally a partition wall and brings men closer to one another. The איתן [perennis], touching it both for the eye and the ear, forms the contrast to יתן חן. This word, an elative formation from יתן = Arab. wtn, denotes that which stretches itself far, and that with reference to time: that which remains the same during the course of time. “That which does not change in time, continuing the same, according to its nature, strong, firm, and thus איתן becomes the designation of the enduring and the solid, whose quality remains always the same.” Thus Orelli, Die hebr. Synonyme der Zeit u. Ewigkeit, 1871. But that in the passage before us it denotes the way of the בגדים as “endlessly going forward,” the explanation of Orelli, after Böttcher (Collectanea, p. 135), is withdrawn by the latter in the new Aehrenlese (where he reads ריב איתן, “constant strife”). And נחל איתן (Deu 21:4) does not mean “a brook, the existence of which is not dependent on the weather and the season of the year,” at least not in accordance with the traditional meaning which is given Sota ix. 5 (cf. the Gemara), but a stony valley; for the Mishna says: איתן כמשׁמעו קשׁה, i.e., איתן is here, according to its verbal meaning, equivalent to קשׁה (hard). We are of the opinion that here, in the midst of the discussion of the law of the עגלה ערופה (the ritual for the atonement of a murder perpetrated by an unknown hand), the same meaning of the איתן is certified which is to be adopted in the passage before us. Maimuni ^{▼▼= R. Moses b. Maimum = Rambam, so called by the Jews from the initial letters of his name = Maimonides, d. 1204.} (in Sota and Hilchoth Rozeach ix. 2) indeed, with the Mishna and Gemara, thinks the meaning of a “strong rushing wâdy” to be compatible; but קשׁה is a word which more naturally denotes the property of the ground than of a river, and the description, Deu 21:4 : in a נחל איתן, in which there is no tillage and sowing, demands for נחל here the idea of the valley, and not primarily that of the valley-brook. According to this tradition, the Targum places a תּקּיפא in the Peshito translation of 15b, and the Venet. translates, after Kimchi, ὁδὸς δὲ ἀνταρτῶν (of ἀνταρτής from ἀνταίρειν) ἰσχυρά. The fundamental idea of remaining like itself, continuing, passes over into the idea of the firm, the hard, so that איתן is a word that interchanges with סלע, Num 24:21, and serves as a figurative designation of the rocky mountains, Jer 49:19, and the rocky framework of the earth, Mic 6:2. Thus the meaning of hardness (πετρῶδες, Mat 13:5) connects itself with the word, and at the same time, according to Deu 21:4, of the uncultivable and the uncultivated. The way of the בּגדים, the treacherous, i.e., the manner in which they transact with men, is stiff, as hard as stone, and repulsive; they follow selfish views, never placing themselves in sympathy with the condition of their neighbour; they are without the tenderness which is connected with fine culture; they remain destitute of feeling in things which, as we say, would soften a stone. It is unnecessary to give a catalogue of the different meanings of this איתן, such as vorago (Jerome), a standing bog (Umbreit), and ever trodden way (Bertheau), etc.; Schultens offers, as frequently, the relatively best: at via perfidorum pertinacissime tensum; but יתן does not mean to strain, but to extend. The lxx has between 15a and 15b the interpolation: τὸ δὲ γνῶναι νόμον διανοίας ἐστὶν ἀγαθῆς.