Pro 19:2 | KD | STEP | The not-knowing of the soul is also not good, And he who hasteneth with the legs after it goeth astray. Fleischer renders נפשׁ as the subj. and לא־טוב as neut. pred.: in and of itself sensual desire is not good, but yet more so if it is without foresight and reflection. With this explanation the words must be otherwise accentuated. Hitzig, in conformity with the accentuation, before us: if desire is without reflection, it is also without success. But where נפשׁ denotes desire or sensuality, it is always shown by the connection, as e.g. , ; here דּעת, referring to the soul as knowing (cf. ), excludes this meaning. But נפשׁ is certainly gen. subjecti ; Luzzatto’s “self-knowledge” is untenable, for this would require דעת נפשׁו; Meîri rightly glosses נפשׁ דעת by שׂכל. After this Zöckler puts Hitzig’s translation right in the following manner: where there is no consideration of the soul, there is no prosperity. But that also is incorrect, for it would require אין־טוב; לא־טוב is always pred., not a substantival clause. Thus the proverb states that בלא־דעת נפשׁ is not good, and that is equivalent to היות בלא־דעת נפשׁ (for the subject to לא־טוב is frequently, as e.g. , ; , an infinitive); or also: בלא־דעת נפשׁ is a virtual noun in the sense of the not-knowing of the soul; for to say לא־דעת was syntactically inadmissible, but the expression is בלא־דעת, not בּלי דעת (בּבלי), because this is used in the sense unintentionally or unexpectedly. The גּם which begins the proverb is difficult. If we lay the principal accent in the translation given above on “not good,” then the placing of גם first is a hyperbaton similar to that in ; ; cf. אך, ; רק, , as if the words were: if the soul is without knowledge, then also ( eo ipso ) it is destitute of anything good. But if we lay the principal accent on the “also,” then the meaning of the poet is, that ignorance of the soul is, like many other things, not good; or (which we prefer without on that account maintaining the original connection of and ), that as on the one side the pride of wisdom, so on the other ignorance is not good. In this case גם belongs more to the subject than to the predicate, but in reality to the whole sentence at the beginning of which it stands. To hasten with the legs (אץ, as ) means now in this connection to set the body in violent agitation, without direction and guidance proceeding from the knowledge possessed by the soul. He who thus hastens after it without being intellectually or morally clear as to the goal and the way, makes a false step, goes astray, fails ( vid ., , where חטאי is the contrast to מצאי).

‏ Proverbs 19:2

Pro 19:2 2 The not-knowing of the soul is also not good, And he who hasteneth with the legs after it goeth astray.

Fleischer renders נפשׁ as the subj. and לא־טוב as neut. pred.: in and of itself sensual desire is not good, but yet more so if it is without foresight and reflection. With this explanation the words must be otherwise accentuated. Hitzig, in conformity with the accentuation, before us: if desire is without reflection, it is also without success. But where נפשׁ denotes desire or sensuality, it is always shown by the connection, as e.g., Pro 23:2; here דּעת, referring to the soul as knowing (cf. Psa 139:14), excludes this meaning. But נפשׁ is certainly gen. subjecti; Luzzatto’s “self-knowledge” is untenable, for this would require דעת נפשׁו; Meîri rightly glosses נפשׁ דעת by שׂכל. After this Zöckler puts Hitzig’s translation right in the following manner: where there is no consideration of the soul, there is no prosperity. But that also is incorrect, for it would require אין־טוב; לא־טוב is always pred., not a substantival clause. Thus the proverb states that בלא־דעת נפשׁ is not good, and that is equivalent to היות בלא־דעת נפשׁ (for the subject to לא־טוב is frequently, as e.g., Pro 17:26; Pro 18:5, an infinitive); or also: בלא־דעת נפשׁ is a virtual noun in the sense of the not-knowing of the soul; for to say לא־דעת was syntactically inadmissible, but the expression is בלא־דעת, not בּלי דעת (בּבלי), because this is used in the sense unintentionally or unexpectedly. The גּם which begins the proverb is difficult. If we lay the principal accent in the translation given above on “not good,” then the placing of גם first is a hyperbaton similar to that in Pro 17:26; Pro 20:11; cf. אך, Pro 17:11; רק, Pro 13:10, as if the words were: if the soul is without knowledge, then also (eo ipso) it is destitute of anything good. But if we lay the principal accent on the “also,” then the meaning of the poet is, that ignorance of the soul is, like many other things, not good; or (which we prefer without on that account maintaining ^{▼▼The old interpreters and also the best Jewish interpreters mar the understanding and interpretation of the text, on the one side, by distinguishing between a nearest and a deeper meaning of Scripture (דרך נגלה and דרך נסתר); on the other by this, that they suppose an inward connection of all the proverbs, and expend useless ingenuity in searching after the connection. The former is the method especially adopted by Immanuel and Meîri, the latter has most of all been used by Arama.} the original connection of Pro 19:1 and Pro 19:2), that as on the one side the pride of wisdom, so on the other ignorance is not good. In this case גם belongs more to the subject than to the predicate, but in reality to the whole sentence at the beginning of which it stands. To hasten with the legs (אץ, as Pro 28:20) means now in this connection to set the body in violent agitation, without direction and guidance proceeding from the knowledge possessed by the soul. He who thus hastens after it without being intellectually or morally clear as to the goal and the way, makes a false step, goes astray, fails (vid., Pro 8:36, where חטאי is the contrast to מצאי).